Welcome, dear students, to Class 11 Logic and Philosophy Chapter 13 Question Answer | Pramana | English Medium | ASSEB. This chapter introduces you to the rich and rigorous theory of knowledge developed by the classical schools of Indian philosophy. The Sanskrit word Pramana literally means “the means or instrument of valid knowledge”, and the elaborate study of these instruments forms the heart of Indian epistemology. By the end of this chapter you will be able to distinguish valid knowledge (prama) from invalid cognition (aprama), state the four logical components of any act of knowing, list the six pramanas accepted in Indian philosophy together with the schools that admit each one, and explain in detail the nature, kinds and examples of perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-apprehension. The chapter closes with a brief comparison with the three Western theories of truth, correspondence, coherence and pragmatic, so that you can appreciate Indian and Western views of valid knowledge side by side.
This article is prepared strictly in accordance with the ASSEB (Assam State School Education Board) syllabus and the SCERT-prescribed textbook for Higher Secondary First Year (Class 11) Logic and Philosophy. It contains a clear summary of the chapter, the complete textbook question and answer set arranged from very short to long answers, additional important questions for examination preparation, a glossary of technical terms, a comparative table of the six pramanas, a school-wise table of pramana acceptance and a separate table of the five members of the Nyaya syllogism.
Summary of Chapter 13: Pramana
Indian philosophy is characteristically practical. Every system, whether orthodox or heterodox, is concerned with the supreme end of human life, namely liberation from suffering, and every system holds that liberation is possible only through correct knowledge of reality. Hence the question “what is valid knowledge and how is it acquired?” occupies a central place in Indian thought. The branch of philosophy that investigates this question is called the theory of knowledge or epistemology, and in Indian tradition it goes by the name of pramana-shastra.
The starting point is a sharp distinction between prama and aprama. Prama is valid, true and definite cognition, that is, knowledge which corresponds to its object, is free from doubt and is uncontradicted by subsequent experience. Aprama is non-valid cognition; it includes doubt (samshaya), error (viparyaya or bhrama), tarka (hypothetical reasoning) and memory (smriti) according to Nyaya, since memory is not a fresh apprehension. The unique cause of valid knowledge is called pramana, the instrument of knowing. Wherever there is an act of cognition, four logical factors are present together, technically known as the pramana-chatushtaya or four-fold structure of knowledge: the knower (pramata), the object known (prameya), the instrument or means of knowledge (pramana) and the resulting valid cognition itself (pramiti or prama).
Different schools of Indian philosophy accept different numbers of pramanas. The materialist Charvaka school accepts only one, namely perception. The Vaisheshika school and the Buddhist school accept two, perception and inference. The Samkhya and Yoga systems and the Jaina tradition accept three, perception, inference and verbal testimony. The Nyaya school of Gautama accepts four, adding comparison to the previous three. The Prabhakara school of Mimamsa accepts five, adding postulation. The Bhatta school of Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta of Shankara accept six, adding non-apprehension. These six exhaust the standard pramanas of Indian philosophy.
The first pramana, pratyaksha or perception, is direct cognition produced by the contact of a sense organ with its object. It is divided into ordinary (laukika) and extraordinary (alaukika) perception. Ordinary perception is again divided into external, where one of the five outer sense organs makes contact with an external object, and internal, where the inner sense or mind perceives mental states such as pleasure and pain. From another standpoint perception is divided into indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka); the first is the bare and undescribed apprehension of an object, the second is the developed perception in which the object is recognised as belonging to a class and qualified by attributes. Extraordinary perception is of three kinds, samanya-lakshana (perception of universals), jnana-lakshana (perception through revived knowledge) and yogaja (the intuitive perception of the yogi).
The second pramana, anumana or inference, is the cognition of an object through the cognition of a sign. The standard example is “the hill has fire because it has smoke, and wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen”. The technical terms are paksha (the subject, the hill), sadhya (the inferable, fire), hetu or linga (the reason or sign, smoke) and vyapti (the universal concomitance between smoke and fire). Inference for oneself (svartha) requires no formal expression, but inference for the sake of others (parartha) is set forth in a five-membered Nyaya syllogism, namely pratijna (statement), hetu (reason), udaharana (universal proposition with example), upanaya (application) and nigamana (conclusion). Inference is again classified as purvavat (inferring effect from cause), sheshavat (inferring cause from effect) and samanyatodrishta (inference from observed coexistence of two things, used to prove imperceptible objects).
The third pramana, upamana or comparison, is the means by which we obtain knowledge of the relation between a name and the object it denotes by analogy. A man who has never seen a wild ox is told by a forester that a gavaya resembles the domestic cow. When he later sees an animal in the forest resembling a cow he recognises it as the gavaya. The fourth pramana, shabda or verbal testimony, is the knowledge of objects derived from the words of a trustworthy person (apta). It is of two kinds, vaidika, the testimony of the eternal Veda which is regarded as super-human and infallible, and laukika, the testimony of any reliable human being, valid only when the speaker is competent and honest.
The fifth pramana, arthapatti or postulation, is the supposition of an unperceived fact in order to explain a fact already known but otherwise inexplicable. The classical example is “the fat Devadatta does not eat by day”. Since he is fat, he must eat; and since he does not eat by day, we must postulate that he eats by night. The sixth pramana, anupalabdhi or non-apprehension, is the means by which we acquire immediate knowledge of the absence of an object. We see that “there is no jar on the floor” not by perceiving the absent jar but by the very absence of its perception in a place where, had it been present, it would have been perceived.
The chapter ends by relating these Indian doctrines to the three classical Western theories of truth. The correspondence theory, dominant from Aristotle to the realists, holds that a judgement is true when it corresponds to a fact in the world; this is close to the Nyaya conception of prama as cognition that agrees with its object. The coherence theory, propounded by the British and German idealists, holds that a judgement is true when it coheres systematically with the rest of our judgements; this is close to the Advaita criterion of non-contradiction (abadhitatva). The pragmatic theory, associated with William James, John Dewey and C. S. Peirce, holds that a judgement is true when acting upon it produces successful results; this is close to the Nyaya criterion of pravritti-samarthya (the practical efficacy of valid knowledge). Indian theory thus combines elements of all three Western theories within a single, more elaborate framework of pramanas.
Textbook Questions and Answers
A. Very Short Answer Questions (1 mark)
1. What is the meaning of the Sanskrit word “Pramana”?
Answer: The word “Pramana” literally means the instrument or means by which valid knowledge (prama) is obtained.
2. What is Prama?
Answer: Prama is valid, true and definite cognition which corresponds to its object and is free from doubt, error and contradiction.
3. What is Aprama?
Answer: Aprama is non-valid or invalid cognition, such as doubt, error, hypothetical reasoning and memory.
4. Who is called the Pramata?
Answer: The Pramata is the knowing subject, that is, the self or person who possesses the cognition.
5. What is Prameya?
Answer: Prameya is the object of valid knowledge, that which is to be known.
6. What is Pramiti?
Answer: Pramiti is the resulting valid cognition itself, the very state of knowing produced by a pramana.
7. How many pramanas does the Charvaka school accept?
Answer: The Charvaka school accepts only one pramana, namely perception (pratyaksha).
8. How many pramanas does the Vaisheshika school accept?
Answer: The Vaisheshika school accepts two pramanas, perception and inference.
9. How many pramanas does the Buddhist school accept?
Answer: The Buddhist school accepts two pramanas, perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana).
10. How many pramanas does the Samkhya school accept?
Answer: The Samkhya school accepts three pramanas, perception, inference and verbal testimony.
11. How many pramanas does the Yoga school accept?
Answer: The Yoga school of Patanjali accepts the same three pramanas as Samkhya: perception, inference and verbal testimony.
12. How many pramanas does the Nyaya school accept?
Answer: The Nyaya school accepts four pramanas, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.
13. How many pramanas does the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa accept?
Answer: The Prabhakara school of Mimamsa accepts five pramanas: perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and postulation.
14. How many pramanas does the Bhatta school of Mimamsa accept?
Answer: The Bhatta school of Mimamsa accepts six pramanas, namely perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-apprehension.
15. How many pramanas does the Advaita Vedanta school accept?
Answer: Advaita Vedanta of Shankara accepts the same six pramanas as the Bhatta Mimamsa.
16. What is Pratyaksha?
Answer: Pratyaksha or perception is the direct, immediate cognition produced by the contact of a sense organ with its object.
17. What is Anumana?
Answer: Anumana or inference is the knowledge of an object through the medium of a known invariable sign and a universal relation called vyapti.
18. What is Upamana?
Answer: Upamana or comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object it denotes, gained on the basis of similarity with a familiar object.
19. What is Shabda?
Answer: Shabda is verbal testimony, the valid knowledge derived from the statement of a trustworthy person (apta).
20. What is Arthapatti?
Answer: Arthapatti or postulation is the supposition of an unperceived fact in order to explain a known fact that is otherwise inexplicable.
21. What is Anupalabdhi?
Answer: Anupalabdhi or non-apprehension is the immediate cognition of the absence of an object, gained through the very non-perception of it.
22. What is laukika pratyaksha?
Answer: Laukika pratyaksha is ordinary perception, in which a sense organ is in normal contact with its object.
23. What is alaukika pratyaksha?
Answer: Alaukika pratyaksha is extraordinary perception, in which the sense-object contact is not of the ordinary type.
24. What is nirvikalpaka pratyaksha?
Answer: Nirvikalpaka pratyaksha is indeterminate perception, the bare apprehension of the object without recognition of its name, class or qualities.
25. What is savikalpaka pratyaksha?
Answer: Savikalpaka pratyaksha is determinate perception, the developed cognition in which the object is recognised as a thing of a certain class possessing certain qualities.
26. What is hetu?
Answer: Hetu is the reason or middle term in an inference, the sign that proves the conclusion; for example, smoke as the sign of fire.
27. What is sadhya?
Answer: Sadhya is that which is to be proved or inferred in an anumana; for example, fire on the hill.
28. What is paksha?
Answer: Paksha is the subject of inference, the locus where the sadhya is to be established; for example, the hill in “the hill has fire”.
29. What is vyapti?
Answer: Vyapti is the invariable and universal concomitance between the hetu and the sadhya, such as “wherever there is smoke there is fire”.
30. How many members are there in the Nyaya syllogism?
Answer: The Nyaya syllogism for the sake of others (parartha-anumana) has five members or avayavas.
31. Name the five members of the Nyaya syllogism.
Answer: The five members are pratijna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya and nigamana.
32. What is purvavat anumana?
Answer: Purvavat anumana is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause, such as inferring rain from gathering clouds.
33. What is sheshavat anumana?
Answer: Sheshavat anumana is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect, such as inferring previous rain from a swollen river.
34. What is samanyatodrishta anumana?
Answer: Samanyatodrishta anumana is inference based on the observed coexistence of two things, used to prove imperceptible objects, for example inferring the motion of the sun from its change of position.
35. Give the standard example of upamana.
Answer: The standard example is the recognition of the gavaya (wild ox) on the basis of its similarity with the cow.
36. Who is called an apta?
Answer: An apta is a trustworthy authority, a person who knows the truth and speaks it without intent to deceive.
37. What are the two kinds of shabda?
Answer: The two kinds of shabda are vaidika (Vedic testimony) and laukika (testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons).
38. Give the standard example of arthapatti.
Answer: The standard example is “the fat Devadatta does not eat by day, therefore he must eat by night”.
39. Give an example of anupalabdhi.
Answer: The cognition “there is no jar on this floor” obtained directly through the non-perception of the jar in the place where it would have been perceived if present.
40. Name the three Western theories of truth.
Answer: The three Western theories of truth are the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and the pragmatic theory.
B. Short Answer Questions (2-3 marks)
1. Distinguish between prama and aprama.
Answer: Prama is valid cognition that corresponds to its object, is free from doubt and is uncontradicted by later experience. Aprama is non-valid cognition, including doubt (samshaya), error (viparyaya), hypothetical reasoning (tarka) and memory (smriti). Prama is a fresh and definite apprehension of reality, while aprama either fails to apprehend reality or distorts it.
2. What are the four factors involved in any act of valid knowledge?
Answer: Any act of valid knowledge involves four factors: (i) Pramata, the knower or subject who has the cognition, (ii) Prameya, the object that is known, (iii) Pramana, the instrument or means of knowledge, and (iv) Pramiti or Prama, the resulting valid cognition itself. These four are together called the pramana-chatushtaya or four-fold structure of knowing.
3. Define pramana. Give one example.
Answer: Pramana is the unique and immediate cause of valid knowledge, the instrument by which a knower acquires correct cognition of an object. For example, the contact of the eye with a coloured object, which produces the visual perception of that colour, is the pramana of pratyaksha; the perception of smoke together with the knowledge of vyapti is the pramana of anumana.
4. Why is memory not regarded as a pramana?
Answer: A pramana must produce a fresh apprehension of an object that is not already known by some other pramana. Memory does not give us a new piece of information; it only reproduces what was already known by an earlier pramana such as perception. Hence the Nyaya tradition treats memory as aprama and not as a means of valid knowledge.
5. State the schools of Indian philosophy that accept only perception as pramana, and explain why.
Answer: Only the Charvaka or materialist school accepts perception as the sole pramana. The Charvakas argue that inference depends on a universal relation (vyapti) which itself can never be conclusively established, that verbal testimony depends on the credibility of speakers and that comparison is reducible to perception. Hence, in their view, only direct sense-perception furnishes certain knowledge.
6. State the schools that accept perception and inference only.
Answer: The Vaisheshika system founded by Kanada and the Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti accept only two pramanas, perception and inference. They include comparison and verbal testimony under inference, holding that all valid knowledge except direct perception ultimately rests on inferential reasoning.
7. State the schools that accept three pramanas.
Answer: The Samkhya school of Kapila, the Yoga school of Patanjali and the Jaina school accept three pramanas: perception, inference and verbal testimony. They reject comparison, postulation and non-apprehension as separate pramanas, treating them as varieties of inference or verbal testimony.
8. Why does the Nyaya school accept four pramanas?
Answer: The Nyaya school of Gautama accepts perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony as four distinct pramanas. According to Nyaya, comparison is the unique source of the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object it denotes (sanjna-sanjnin sambandha), and this knowledge cannot be reduced to inference or verbal testimony. Hence comparison is a separate pramana, and adding it to the previous three gives four.
9. Why does the Bhatta Mimamsa accept six pramanas?
Answer: The Bhatta Mimamsa school, following Kumarila Bhatta, accepts six pramanas because it regards postulation (arthapatti) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as irreducible to the previous four. Postulation is needed to explain unperceived facts that account for known ones, and non-apprehension is needed to explain the immediate cognition of the absence of objects. Therefore Bhatta and the Advaita school accept perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-apprehension.
10. Define pratyaksha and state its kinds.
Answer: Pratyaksha is the direct cognition produced by the contact of a sense organ with its object. It is divided into ordinary (laukika) and extraordinary (alaukika) pratyaksha. Laukika pratyaksha is again classified as external (bahya) and internal (manasa), and as indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka). Alaukika pratyaksha has three sub-kinds, samanya-lakshana, jnana-lakshana and yogaja.
11. Distinguish between external and internal perception.
Answer: External perception (bahya pratyaksha) takes place through the five outer sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin) which come into contact with external objects such as colour, sound, smell, taste and touch. Internal perception (manasa pratyaksha) takes place through the inner sense or mind (manas), and its objects are mental states such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, cognition and volition.
12. Distinguish between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyaksha.
Answer: Nirvikalpaka pratyaksha is indeterminate perception, the immediate, undifferentiated apprehension of an object as a bare “this” without identification of its class, name or qualities. Savikalpaka pratyaksha is determinate perception, the developed cognition in which the object is recognised as belonging to a class and as possessing definite attributes, expressible in such judgements as “this is a cow” or “this is white”.
13. Briefly explain the three kinds of alaukika pratyaksha.
Answer: The three extraordinary perceptions are: (i) Samanya-lakshana, the perception of a universal class through one of its members, as when we perceive cowness in seeing a particular cow; (ii) Jnana-lakshana, the perception of an attribute through a previously formed knowledge, as when we perceive the fragrance of a piece of sandalwood by the eye, our previous knowledge of its smell being revived; (iii) Yogaja, the intuitive perception of past, future and remote objects acquired by the meditative concentration of the yogi.
14. Define anumana and explain its components.
Answer: Anumana is the cognition of an unperceived object through the cognition of a known sign and a universal relation between the sign and the object. Its main components are paksha (the subject), sadhya (the inferable property), hetu (the reason or sign) and vyapti (the universal relation between sadhya and hetu). For example, in “the hill has fire because it has smoke”, the hill is paksha, fire is sadhya, smoke is hetu and the rule “wherever there is smoke there is fire” is vyapti.
15. State the five members of the Nyaya syllogism with an example.
Answer: The five members are: (i) Pratijna, the proposition: “the hill has fire”; (ii) Hetu, the reason: “because it has smoke”; (iii) Udaharana, the universal proposition with example: “wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen”; (iv) Upanaya, the application: “the hill has such smoke”; (v) Nigamana, the conclusion: “therefore the hill has fire”.
16. Distinguish between svartha and parartha anumana.
Answer: Svartha anumana is inference for one’s own sake; it is a mental process in which one passes from the perception of the sign and the recollection of vyapti to the cognition of the unseen object, without articulating the steps in language. Parartha anumana is inference for the sake of others; here the same process is expressed in a five-membered syllogism so that another person may be persuaded of the conclusion.
17. Explain purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrishta inferences.
Answer: Purvavat is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause, as inferring future rain from dense clouds. Sheshavat is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect, as inferring previous rain from a swollen river. Samanyatodrishta is the inference of an imperceptible object from the observed coexistence of two things, as inferring the unseen motion of the sun from its change of position in the sky.
18. Define upamana with an example.
Answer: Upamana is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by it, gained on the basis of similarity with a familiar object. The classical example is the gavaya: a townsman, told that a gavaya resembles a cow, sees an animal of that description in the forest and recognises it as the gavaya, thereby learning the name-object relation.
19. Define shabda and state its kinds.
Answer: Shabda is the valid knowledge of an object derived from the statement of a trustworthy person (apta). It is of two kinds: (i) Vaidika shabda, the testimony of the eternal Veda, regarded as super-human and absolutely valid, dealing with super-sensible matters such as Dharma and liberation; (ii) Laukika shabda, the testimony of any reliable human being concerning ordinary worldly matters, valid only when the speaker is competent and honest.
20. Define arthapatti with an example.
Answer: Arthapatti is the postulation of an unperceived fact to account for a known fact that would otherwise be inexplicable. The classical example is “the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day”. Since fatness presupposes eating and Devadatta is observed not to eat by day, the only way to reconcile the two facts is to postulate that he eats by night. The conclusion “Devadatta eats by night” is the result of arthapatti.
21. Define anupalabdhi with an example.
Answer: Anupalabdhi is the means of cognising the absence of an object directly through its non-perception. When we look at the floor and do not perceive a jar that would have been perceived if it had been present, we cognise immediately that “there is no jar on the floor”. Such cognition of absence (abhava) cannot be obtained by perception (which apprehends only existing things), so the Bhattas and Advaitins admit anupalabdhi as a separate pramana.
22. State the correspondence theory of truth.
Answer: The correspondence theory holds that a judgement is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact in the external world. The judgement “the sky is blue” is true because in fact the sky is blue. This view, defended by Aristotle, the realists and Bertrand Russell, agrees broadly with the Nyaya conception of prama as cognition that agrees with its object (yatharthanubhava).
23. State the coherence theory of truth.
Answer: The coherence theory holds that a judgement is true if and only if it is consistent and systematically coherent with the body of judgements already accepted as true. Defended by idealists such as Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet, this theory makes truth an internal property of a system of beliefs. It is comparable to the Advaita criterion of non-contradiction (abadhitatva).
24. State the pragmatic theory of truth.
Answer: The pragmatic theory, championed by C. S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey, holds that a judgement is true if and only if acting upon it leads to successful and satisfactory practical consequences. “Truth is what works” in their well-known phrase. This view is comparable to the Nyaya criterion of pravritti-samarthya, the practical efficacy of valid knowledge.
C. Long Answer Questions (5-6 marks)
1. What is pramana? Discuss the four-fold structure of knowledge.
Answer: The Sanskrit word pramana is formed from the root ma, “to measure or know”, with the prefix pra and the suffix ana; etymologically it means “the means by which one measures or knows”. In Indian epistemology pramana technically denotes the unique cause of valid knowledge (prama). Just as the axe is the instrument of cutting and not the agent or object, the pramana is the instrument of knowing and not the knower or the known.
Indian thinkers analyse every act of valid knowing into four logical factors that always go together. These four factors are technically known as the pramana-chatushtaya. (i) Pramata, the knower, is the conscious self in whom the cognition arises. Without a knowing subject there can be no cognition. (ii) Prameya, the object known, is that towards which the cognition is directed. The object may be a physical thing, a quality, an action, a universal, a relation or even an absence. (iii) Pramana, the means of knowledge, is the unique cause that produces valid cognition. The five most commonly recognised pramanas are pratyaksha, anumana, upamana, shabda and, in some schools, arthapatti and anupalabdhi. (iv) Pramiti or prama, the cognition itself, is the resulting valid awareness “this is a jar” or “the hill has fire”. The four are inseparable in any act of knowledge: the pramata uses the pramana to apprehend the prameya, and the result is pramiti.
This four-fold analysis is important because it shows that knowledge is not a purely subjective state but a real relation between a knower and an object, mediated by an appropriate instrument. It also explains why different pramanas are required for different kinds of objects: physical things are known by perception, imperceptible objects by inference, name-object relations by comparison, supersensible matters by verbal testimony, unperceived causes of known facts by postulation and absences by non-apprehension. Pramana-shastra, the science of pramanas, therefore lies at the foundation of every Indian philosophical system.
2. Discuss the school-wise acceptance of pramanas in Indian philosophy.
Answer: Indian philosophical schools differ on the number of pramanas they accept, and the differences are deeply connected with their metaphysical positions.
(i) Charvaka: The materialist Charvaka school accepts only one pramana, perception. It rejects inference because vyapti can never be conclusively known, and it rejects verbal testimony because the speakers may deceive. Only what is directly perceived is accepted as real.
(ii) Vaisheshika and Buddhists: Both accept two pramanas, perception and inference. They subsume comparison and verbal testimony under inference, holding that any knowledge based on similarity or words is reducible to inferential reasoning.
(iii) Samkhya, Yoga and Jainas: These schools accept three pramanas, perception, inference and verbal testimony. They include comparison, postulation and non-apprehension under inference, but they accept verbal testimony as a separate pramana because of its independent role in conveying super-sensible truths.
(iv) Nyaya: Founded by Gautama, Nyaya accepts four pramanas, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Comparison is taken as a distinct pramana because it alone gives the relation between a name and the object it denotes.
(v) Prabhakara Mimamsa: The Prabhakara school of Mimamsa adds postulation to the four of Nyaya and accepts five pramanas. Postulation, in their view, cannot be reduced to inference because it presupposes the impossibility of explaining a known fact rather than a vyapti.
(vi) Bhatta Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta: The Bhatta school of Mimamsa, founded by Kumarila, and the Advaita Vedanta of Shankara, add a sixth pramana, non-apprehension, to account for the immediate cognition of absence. Hence they accept six pramanas in all: perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and non-apprehension.
The graded acceptance of pramanas, from one in Charvaka to six in Bhatta and Advaita, reflects each school’s epistemological generosity and its readiness to admit irreducible sources of knowledge in addition to the simplest.
3. Define pratyaksha. Explain its various kinds.
Answer: Pratyaksha or perception is the direct, immediate cognition produced by the contact (sannikarsha) of a sense organ with its object. It is the most fundamental of all pramanas and is recognised by every Indian school. The Nyaya definition, given by Gautama, is “the cognition produced by sense-object contact, which is non-verbal, non-erroneous and definite”.
Perception is classified in several ways. (i) Laukika and alaukika: When the sense-object contact is of the ordinary type, the perception is called laukika or ordinary; when it is extraordinary, the perception is called alaukika. (ii) External and internal: Laukika pratyaksha is again divided into external (bahya), produced by contact of the five outer sense organs with their respective objects, and internal (manasa), produced by the contact of the inner sense or mind with mental states such as pleasure, pain and desire. (iii) Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka: Perception is also classified as indeterminate, the bare apprehension of an object before any conceptual elaboration, and determinate, the developed perception in which the object is judged to belong to a class and to possess attributes.
Alaukika pratyaksha is of three kinds. (a) Samanya-lakshana: through the perception of one cow we cognise the universal cowness present in all cows. (b) Jnana-lakshana: through previous knowledge revived in memory, we may perceive an attribute through a different sense organ; for example, when we say “the sandalwood looks fragrant”, the eye in fact perceives only colour and shape, but the previously known fragrance is revived and seems to be perceived. (c) Yogaja: the meditative concentration of the yogi enables him to perceive past, future, distant and subtle objects directly. Together, these various kinds show that perception in Indian philosophy is far richer than the merely sensory perception of common life.
4. Define anumana. Discuss its components and the five-membered syllogism with examples.
Answer: Anumana is the cognition of an unperceived object through the cognition of a known sign and a universal relation between the sign and the object. The standard example is the inference “the hill has fire because it has smoke, and wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen”. Anumana literally means “after-knowing”, since it follows after the knowledge of the sign.
The components of anumana are: (i) Paksha, the subject of inference, the locus where the property is to be established; in our example, the hill. (ii) Sadhya, the inferable property; in our example, fire. (iii) Hetu or linga, the reason or sign; in our example, smoke. (iv) Vyapti, the invariable concomitance between hetu and sadhya, expressed as “wherever there is smoke there is fire”. (v) Paksha-dharmata, the presence of the hetu in the paksha, “the hill has smoke”. The conclusion follows from the joint cognition of vyapti and paksha-dharmata.
For the sake of others, the inference is set out in five members or avayavas: (1) Pratijna, the statement of the conclusion: “the hill has fire”. (2) Hetu, the statement of the reason: “because it has smoke”. (3) Udaharana, the statement of vyapti with example: “wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen”. (4) Upanaya, the application: “the hill has such smoke”. (5) Nigamana, the conclusion as established: “therefore the hill has fire”.
Anumana is also classified as purvavat (effect inferred from cause, e.g., rain from clouds), sheshavat (cause inferred from effect, e.g., past rain from a swollen river) and samanyatodrishta (inferring imperceptibles from observed coexistence, e.g., the motion of the sun from its change of position). The Nyaya theory of inference is the most elaborate Indian contribution to logic and bears comparison with the Aristotelian syllogism.
5. Define upamana and explain it with the gavaya example.
Answer: Upamana is the third pramana of the Nyaya school. It is defined as the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by it, gained on the basis of similarity with a familiar object. Upamana literally means “comparison”, and it operates whenever we identify an unfamiliar object as the bearer of a name we have heard described.
The classical example is that of the gavaya. Suppose a townsman has never seen a wild ox or gavaya. A forester tells him: “A gavaya resembles a domestic cow.” Equipped only with this verbal description, the man goes into the forest. There he sees an animal exactly like a cow but living wild, and at once he infers, “this animal must be the gavaya the forester spoke of”. The cognition that the name “gavaya” refers to this kind of animal is the result of upamana.
The Nyaya analysis of this case has three stages: (i) the prior knowledge of similarity, “this animal is like a cow”; (ii) the recollection of the verbal description, “the gavaya resembles the cow”; (iii) the resulting knowledge of the name-object relation, “this animal is what is called gavaya”. The first two stages are perception and verbal testimony respectively, but the third stage, the cognition of the name-object relation, is held by Nyaya to be the unique product of upamana, irreducible to either perception, inference or verbal testimony. Hence upamana is admitted as a distinct pramana.
6. Define shabda. Discuss its kinds with examples.
Answer: Shabda is the valid knowledge of an object derived from the statement of a trustworthy person (apta). The Nyaya school defines shabda as “aptopadesha”, the instruction of a competent and honest authority. The components of shabda are the words of the speaker, the meaning of those words, the relation between word and meaning (called shakti), and the trustworthiness of the speaker.
For shabda to be a valid pramana the speaker must be an apta, that is, one who knows the truth and is willing to communicate it without intent to deceive. The hearer must understand the words, know the conventional meanings (shakti), recognise the syntactic and contextual relations of the sentence and have no contrary belief.
Shabda is classified into two kinds. (i) Vaidika shabda: the testimony of the eternal Veda, which the orthodox schools regard as super-human (apaurusheya) and intrinsically valid (svatahpramana). It deals chiefly with super-sensible matters such as Dharma, the supreme self and liberation, which lie beyond the scope of perception and inference. (ii) Laukika shabda: the testimony of ordinary trustworthy human beings concerning worldly matters, such as a witness in a court of law, a teacher in the classroom or a guide in a forest. Laukika shabda is valid only when the speaker is in fact competent and honest. By recognising shabda as a separate pramana, Indian epistemology accommodates the social and historical dimension of human knowledge in a systematic way.
7. Define arthapatti and explain it with an example.
Answer: Arthapatti, postulation or implication, is the supposition of an unperceived fact in order to explain a fact already known but otherwise inexplicable. The Mimamsakas, who first systematically defended arthapatti as a separate pramana, argue that we cognise the unperceived fact directly from the impossibility of explaining the known fact without it.
The classical example is the case of fat Devadatta. We observe two known facts: (i) Devadatta is fat, and (ii) Devadatta does not eat during the day. These two facts contradict each other, since fatness presupposes regular eating. The contradiction can be removed only by postulating an unperceived third fact: (iii) Devadatta eats during the night. The cognition “Devadatta eats by night” is not derived from perception (we have not seen him eat at night), nor from inference (we have no vyapti such as “all who eat by night are fat”), nor from verbal testimony. It is forced upon us by the necessity of explaining the known facts, and this peculiar source is called arthapatti.
Other classical examples include “Devadatta is alive though absent from his house, therefore he must be somewhere outside” and “the meaning of the sentence is so-and-so, otherwise the words would be unintelligible”. The Prabhakara, Bhatta and Advaita schools accept arthapatti as a separate pramana, while the Nyaya school treats it as a special case of inference.
8. Define anupalabdhi and explain it with an example.
Answer: Anupalabdhi or non-apprehension is the means of cognising the absence (abhava) of an object directly through the non-perception of it. The Bhatta Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools admit anupalabdhi as a separate pramana, holding that absence is a real category that cannot be apprehended by any of the other pramanas.
The classical example is the cognition “there is no jar on the floor”. We look at the floor; we have the appropriate sense-organ-object contact and the suitable conditions for perceiving a jar; yet no perception of a jar arises. From the very absence of the perception we cognise immediately the absence of the jar. The cognition is direct because we do not need to argue, “I would have seen the jar if it had been there, but I do not see it, therefore it is not there”. The cognition of absence is given as immediately as the cognition of presence is given in perception.
Four kinds of absence are usually distinguished: pragabhava (prior non-existence, the absence of a pot before its production), pradhvamsabhava (posterior non-existence, the absence of a pot after its destruction), atyantabhava (absolute non-existence, “there is no horn on a hare”) and anyonyabhava (mutual non-existence, “a cow is not a horse”). Each kind of absence is cognised by anupalabdhi. The Nyaya school, by contrast, treats negative cognition as a special case of perception or inference and does not admit anupalabdhi as a separate pramana.
9. Discuss the three Western theories of truth and compare them with the Indian view.
Answer: Western philosophers have offered three principal theories of truth, each capturing one important feature of valid knowledge.
(i) The correspondence theory, defended from Aristotle through the medieval realists down to Bertrand Russell and the early analytic philosophers, holds that a judgement is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact in the world. To say “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is in fact white. Truth is therefore a relation between thought and reality.
(ii) The coherence theory, defended by the British and German idealists Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet and Blanshard, holds that a judgement is true if and only if it is consistent and systematically coherent with the larger body of judgements we accept as true. On this view truth is an internal property of a system of beliefs.
(iii) The pragmatic theory, defended by C. S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey, holds that a judgement is true if and only if acting upon it leads to successful, satisfactory and useful consequences in experience. Truth, in James’s phrase, is “what works”.
The Indian view of valid knowledge unites elements of all three. The Nyaya definition of prama as “yatharthanubhava”, cognition that agrees with its object, is essentially correspondence. The criterion of non-contradiction (abadhitatva) used by the Advaita Vedanta to distinguish empirical truth from illusion is essentially coherence. The criterion of pravritti-samarthya, the practical efficacy of valid knowledge, used in Nyaya, Mimamsa and Buddhism, is essentially pragmatic. Indian theory thus combines correspondence, coherence and pragmatic considerations within a single framework, while emphasising in addition the diversity of the means by which valid cognition is produced. This integrated approach is one of the great strengths of Indian epistemology.
Additional Important Questions and Answers
D. Multiple Choice Questions
1. The branch of philosophy that investigates the nature and means of valid knowledge is called:
(a) Metaphysics (b) Epistemology (c) Ethics (d) Aesthetics
Answer: (b) Epistemology.
2. Valid cognition that corresponds to its object is called:
(a) Aprama (b) Smriti (c) Prama (d) Samshaya
Answer: (c) Prama.
3. The instrument or means of valid knowledge is called:
(a) Prameya (b) Pramata (c) Pramana (d) Pramiti
Answer: (c) Pramana.
4. The knower in any cognition is called:
(a) Pramata (b) Prameya (c) Pramana (d) Pramiti
Answer: (a) Pramata.
5. The object of valid knowledge is called:
(a) Pramata (b) Prameya (c) Pramana (d) Pramiti
Answer: (b) Prameya.
6. The Charvaka school accepts how many pramanas?
(a) One (b) Two (c) Three (d) Four
Answer: (a) One, perception only.
7. The Vaisheshika school accepts:
(a) Only perception (b) Perception and inference (c) Perception, inference and testimony (d) Six pramanas
Answer: (b) Perception and inference.
8. The Samkhya school accepts how many pramanas?
(a) Two (b) Three (c) Four (d) Six
Answer: (b) Three.
9. The Nyaya school of Gautama accepts:
(a) Two pramanas (b) Three pramanas (c) Four pramanas (d) Six pramanas
Answer: (c) Four pramanas.
10. The Bhatta Mimamsa school accepts how many pramanas?
(a) Three (b) Four (c) Five (d) Six
Answer: (d) Six.
11. The first and most fundamental pramana is:
(a) Anumana (b) Pratyaksha (c) Upamana (d) Shabda
Answer: (b) Pratyaksha.
12. Knowledge produced by sense-object contact is:
(a) Anumana (b) Upamana (c) Pratyaksha (d) Anupalabdhi
Answer: (c) Pratyaksha.
13. Indeterminate perception is called:
(a) Savikalpaka (b) Nirvikalpaka (c) Laukika (d) Alaukika
Answer: (b) Nirvikalpaka.
14. Determinate perception is called:
(a) Savikalpaka (b) Nirvikalpaka (c) Manasa (d) Yogaja
Answer: (a) Savikalpaka.
15. Yogic intuition belongs to:
(a) Laukika pratyaksha (b) Alaukika pratyaksha (c) Anumana (d) Shabda
Answer: (b) Alaukika pratyaksha.
16. The middle term of an inference is called:
(a) Sadhya (b) Paksha (c) Hetu (d) Vyapti
Answer: (c) Hetu.
17. The locus of inference, where the sadhya is to be established, is called:
(a) Hetu (b) Paksha (c) Sadhya (d) Linga
Answer: (b) Paksha.
18. The invariable relation between the hetu and the sadhya is called:
(a) Sadhya (b) Paksha (c) Vyapti (d) Pramiti
Answer: (c) Vyapti.
19. The Nyaya syllogism for the sake of others has how many members?
(a) Three (b) Four (c) Five (d) Six
Answer: (c) Five.
20. The first member of the five-membered Nyaya syllogism is:
(a) Hetu (b) Pratijna (c) Udaharana (d) Nigamana
Answer: (b) Pratijna.
21. Inferring fire from smoke is an example of:
(a) Purvavat (b) Sheshavat (c) Samanyatodrishta (d) Upamana
Answer: (b) Sheshavat (or in some classifications, a general anumana — inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect).
22. Inferring rain from gathering clouds is an example of:
(a) Purvavat (b) Sheshavat (c) Samanyatodrishta (d) Anupalabdhi
Answer: (a) Purvavat.
23. Inferring previous rain from a swollen river is an example of:
(a) Purvavat (b) Sheshavat (c) Samanyatodrishta (d) Arthapatti
Answer: (b) Sheshavat.
24. Inferring the motion of the sun from its change of position is an example of:
(a) Purvavat (b) Sheshavat (c) Samanyatodrishta (d) Upamana
Answer: (c) Samanyatodrishta.
25. The classical example of upamana involves:
(a) Smoke and fire (b) Cow and gavaya (c) Devadatta and food (d) Jar and floor
Answer: (b) Cow and gavaya.
26. The testimony of a trustworthy person is called:
(a) Anumana (b) Upamana (c) Shabda (d) Anupalabdhi
Answer: (c) Shabda.
27. A trustworthy authority in shabda is called:
(a) Pramata (b) Apta (c) Acharya (d) Yogi
Answer: (b) Apta.
28. The two kinds of shabda are:
(a) Vaidika and laukika (b) Internal and external (c) Direct and indirect (d) Affirmative and negative
Answer: (a) Vaidika and laukika.
29. The classical example of arthapatti is:
(a) Smoke and fire (b) Cow and gavaya (c) Fat Devadatta who does not eat by day (d) Jar on the floor
Answer: (c) Fat Devadatta who does not eat by day.
30. The cognition of “no jar on the floor” exemplifies:
(a) Pratyaksha (b) Anumana (c) Arthapatti (d) Anupalabdhi
Answer: (d) Anupalabdhi.
31. The correspondence theory of truth is associated with:
(a) William James (b) Bradley (c) Aristotle (d) John Dewey
Answer: (c) Aristotle.
32. The coherence theory of truth is associated with:
(a) Russell (b) Aristotle (c) Bradley (d) Peirce
Answer: (c) Bradley.
33. The pragmatic theory of truth is associated with:
(a) Hegel (b) William James (c) Plato (d) Kant
Answer: (b) William James.
E. Fill in the Blanks
1. Valid knowledge is called __________.
Answer: Prama.
2. Invalid cognition is called __________.
Answer: Aprama.
3. The knower of valid knowledge is called __________.
Answer: Pramata.
4. The object of valid knowledge is called __________.
Answer: Prameya.
5. The instrument of valid knowledge is called __________.
Answer: Pramana.
6. The resulting valid cognition itself is called __________.
Answer: Pramiti.
7. The Charvaka school accepts only __________ as pramana.
Answer: Pratyaksha (perception).
8. The Nyaya school accepts __________ pramanas.
Answer: Four.
9. The Bhatta Mimamsa accepts __________ pramanas.
Answer: Six.
10. Indeterminate perception is called __________.
Answer: Nirvikalpaka pratyaksha.
11. The intuitive perception of the yogi is called __________.
Answer: Yogaja pratyaksha.
12. The middle term of an inference is called __________.
Answer: Hetu.
13. The universal concomitance between hetu and sadhya is called __________.
Answer: Vyapti.
14. The five members of the Nyaya syllogism are pratijna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya and __________.
Answer: Nigamana.
15. The pramana that gives knowledge of the relation between a name and an object through similarity is __________.
Answer: Upamana.
16. A trustworthy authority is called __________.
Answer: Apta.
17. The pramana that postulates an unperceived fact to explain a known fact is __________.
Answer: Arthapatti.
18. The pramana of non-apprehension is called __________.
Answer: Anupalabdhi.
19. The Western theory that defines truth as agreement with reality is the __________ theory.
Answer: Correspondence.
20. The Western theory that defines truth as success in action is the __________ theory.
Answer: Pragmatic.
F. True or False
1. Pramana is the instrument of valid knowledge. Answer: True.
2. Memory is regarded by Nyaya as a pramana. Answer: False. Memory is treated as aprama.
3. The Charvaka school accepts only perception as pramana. Answer: True.
4. The Buddhist school accepts four pramanas. Answer: False. The Buddhists accept only two.
5. The Samkhya school accepts comparison as a separate pramana. Answer: False. Samkhya accepts only three pramanas and treats comparison under inference.
6. The Nyaya school accepts six pramanas. Answer: False. Nyaya accepts four.
7. Bhatta Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta accept six pramanas. Answer: True.
8. Pratyaksha is divided into laukika and alaukika. Answer: True.
9. Nirvikalpaka pratyaksha is the determinate perception of qualified objects. Answer: False. Nirvikalpaka is the indeterminate, undescribed perception.
10. Yogaja pratyaksha is a kind of alaukika pratyaksha. Answer: True.
11. Hetu is the property to be inferred. Answer: False. Hetu is the reason or middle term; sadhya is the inferable property.
12. Vyapti is the universal concomitance between hetu and sadhya. Answer: True.
13. Pratijna is the conclusion of the Nyaya syllogism. Answer: False. Pratijna is the first member, the statement of the conclusion to be proved; nigamana is the established conclusion.
14. Inferring rain from clouds is purvavat anumana. Answer: True.
15. Upamana gives knowledge of the relation between a name and an object. Answer: True.
16. Vaidika shabda is the testimony of ordinary persons. Answer: False. Vaidika shabda is the testimony of the eternal Veda.
17. Arthapatti involves postulating an unperceived fact to explain a known fact. Answer: True.
18. Anupalabdhi is the cognition of presence. Answer: False. Anupalabdhi is the cognition of absence.
19. The correspondence theory of truth is associated with William James. Answer: False. The pragmatic theory is associated with James.
20. The pragmatic theory of truth defines truth as practical success. Answer: True.
Comparative Tables
Table 1: Glossary of Key Terms in Pramana Theory
| Term | Sanskrit | Meaning in English |
| Prama | प्रमा | Valid, true and definite cognition. |
| Aprama | अप्रमा | Non-valid cognition (doubt, error, memory). |
| Pramana | प्रमाण | Instrument or means of valid knowledge. |
| Pramata | प्रमाता | The knower or knowing subject. |
| Prameya | प्रमेय | The object of valid knowledge. |
| Pramiti | प्रमिति | The resulting valid cognition itself. |
| Pratyaksha | प्रत्यक्ष | Perception, direct sense cognition. |
| Anumana | अनुमान | Inference, indirect cognition through a sign. |
| Upamana | उपमान | Comparison, knowledge by analogy. |
| Shabda | शब्द | Verbal testimony of a trustworthy authority. |
| Arthapatti | अर्थापत्ति | Postulation of an unperceived fact. |
| Anupalabdhi | अनुपलब्धि | Non-apprehension, cognition of absence. |
| Apta | आप्त | A trustworthy authority whose testimony is valid. |
| Hetu / Linga | हेतु / लिङ्ग | The reason or sign in inference. |
| Sadhya | साध्य | The inferable property to be established. |
| Paksha | पक्ष | The subject of inference, the locus of sadhya. |
| Vyapti | व्याप्ति | Universal concomitance between hetu and sadhya. |
| Nirvikalpaka | निर्विकल्पक | Indeterminate, undescribed perception. |
| Savikalpaka | सविकल्पक | Determinate, qualified perception. |
| Laukika | लौकिक | Ordinary perception or testimony. |
| Alaukika | अलौकिक | Extraordinary perception (Samanya, Jnana, Yogaja). |
| Abadhitatva | अबाधितत्व | Non-contradiction, an Advaita criterion of truth. |
| Pravritti-samarthya | प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य | Practical efficacy, the Nyaya pragmatic criterion. |
Table 2: The Six Pramanas at a Glance
| No. | Pramana | Meaning | Standard Example | Type of Object |
| 1 | Pratyaksha | Perception | Seeing a jar with the eyes. | Sensible objects. |
| 2 | Anumana | Inference | “The hill has fire because it has smoke.” | Imperceptible objects connected with perceptible signs. |
| 3 | Upamana | Comparison | Recognising the gavaya as resembling a cow. | The relation between a name and the thing denoted. |
| 4 | Shabda | Verbal Testimony | The Vedas, a trustworthy teacher’s words. | Super-sensible truths and reported facts. |
| 5 | Arthapatti | Postulation | “Fat Devadatta does not eat by day, so he eats by night.” | Unperceived facts that explain known facts. |
| 6 | Anupalabdhi | Non-apprehension | “There is no jar on the floor.” | The absence (abhava) of objects. |
Table 3: School-wise Acceptance of Pramanas
| School | Number | Pramanas Accepted |
| Charvaka | 1 | Pratyaksha only. |
| Vaisheshika | 2 | Pratyaksha, Anumana. |
| Buddhist | 2 | Pratyaksha, Anumana. |
| Samkhya | 3 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Shabda. |
| Yoga | 3 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Shabda. |
| Jaina | 3 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Shabda. |
| Nyaya | 4 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Upamana, Shabda. |
| Prabhakara Mimamsa | 5 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Upamana, Shabda, Arthapatti. |
| Bhatta Mimamsa | 6 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Upamana, Shabda, Arthapatti, Anupalabdhi. |
| Advaita Vedanta | 6 | Pratyaksha, Anumana, Upamana, Shabda, Arthapatti, Anupalabdhi. |
Table 4: The Five Members (Pancha-avayava) of the Nyaya Syllogism
| Order | Member | Function | Standard Example (Hill, Smoke, Fire) |
| 1 | Pratijna (Proposition) | States the conclusion to be proved. | “The hill has fire.” |
| 2 | Hetu (Reason) | States the middle term as the reason. | “Because it has smoke.” |
| 3 | Udaharana (Universal proposition with example) | States the vyapti and gives a corroborating instance. | “Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen.” |
| 4 | Upanaya (Application) | Applies the universal rule to the present case. | “The hill has such smoke as is invariably accompanied by fire.” |
| 5 | Nigamana (Conclusion) | Restates the conclusion as established. | “Therefore the hill has fire.” |
Table 5: Three Western Theories of Truth and Their Indian Parallels
| Theory | Definition of Truth | Chief Western Defenders | Indian Parallel |
| Correspondence | Truth is agreement of judgement with fact. | Aristotle, Russell, the realists. | Nyaya prama as yatharthanubhava. |
| Coherence | Truth is coherence of judgement with the system of accepted beliefs. | Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Blanshard. | Advaita criterion of abadhitatva (non-contradiction). |
| Pragmatic | Truth is the practical success of acting on the judgement. | Peirce, William James, John Dewey. | Nyaya pravritti-samarthya (practical efficacy). |
Conclusion
The doctrine of pramana is the bedrock of classical Indian philosophy. By distinguishing prama from aprama and by identifying the four logical factors of every act of knowing, Indian thinkers established a sophisticated framework within which to debate the metaphysical questions concerning the self, the world and the supreme reality. The systematic study of pratyaksha, anumana, upamana, shabda, arthapatti and anupalabdhi shows the remarkable variety of legitimate sources of knowledge that the Indian tradition has recognised, and the comparison with the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth demonstrates that the Indian approach is not narrowly partisan but combines the strongest features of all three Western views. A clear grasp of this chapter equips the Class 11 student of the ASSEB syllabus with both an indispensable vocabulary and a powerful intellectual framework for the rest of Indian philosophy.
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